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““As with the dualism of ‘wave-particles,’ we may live in a world that is 
simultaneously continuous and discontinuous. Which it is at any time may 









Barkley Rosser has been a pioneer in arguing the case for the mathematics of 
discontinuity, broadly conceived, to be placed at the foundations of modelling 
economic dynamics. In this paper we reconsider this vision from the broad 
perspective of a variety of different kinds of mathematics and suggest a 
broadening of Rosser’s methodology to the study of economic dynamics. 
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“By one of the many roughnesses or even superficialities forced upon us by the nature 
of the task which this volume is to fulfil, we may characterize this as a difference 
between microscopic and macroscopic points of view: there is as little contradiction 
between them as there is between calling the contour of a forest discontinuous for 
some and smooth for other purposes.” 
Schumpeter, 1939, p. 227.
3 
Barkley Rosser, for almost thirty years, has been tirelessly pursuing an interesting and 
innovative research program on developing advanced applied mathematical theoretical 
technologies to provide a vision for complex economic dynamics, at macro, micro and 
methodological frontiers.  
Our own knowledge of his impressive contributions along these lines go ‘back to the 
beginning’, so to speak, of his published work, particularly his two early capital theoretic 
contributions. At the tail end of the capital theory controversies – indeed, during the brief 
afterglow of that debate – Rosser gave the twin-problems of reswitching and capital-reversal 
an unusual interpretation in terms of a cusp catastrophe (Rosser, 1978, 1983). Rosser was 
typically candid about the ‘eccentric’ nature of his reswiching model (see, especially, § III, in 
Rosser, 1983, pp. 184-190). However, our interpretation of the ‘eccentricities’ in the paper 
are of a different methodological and economic theoretic nature. The puritan’s model of 
reswitching and capital reversal, i.e., Sraffa’s own, has no scope for formal dynamics
4 or 
optimization – whether of a static or dynamic nature – in it! But that belongs to another story 
than the one we try to tell here. 
Here we shall, instead, concentrate on ‘reconsidering’ Rosser’s visions on the mathematics 
and economics of continuity, discontinuity and dynamics. 
In the next section we discuss and try to suggest a view of ‘The Mathematics of (Dis)-
Continuity’, that may suggest a broadening of the Rosser vision in new mathematical 










with a deeper and wider perspective from the point of view of computational economic 
dynamics.  
In section III, we give an example of how an apparently ‘discontinuous’ dynamic 
phenomenon in macroeconomic dynamics that can be given a new interpretation and 
observational validity in terms of non-standard analysis. 
The brief concluding section summarizes our discussion from methodological and 
epistemological perspectives and suggests ways in which we should go beyond the frontiers 
to which Barkley Rosser’s work, on the issues mentioned above, has brought us. 
§2. The Pure Mathematics of Continuity – and Discontinuity 
“”Somehow it is appropriate if ironic that sharply divergent opinions exist in the 
mathematical House of Discontinuity with respect to the appropriate method for 
analyzing discontinuous phenomena.” 
 
Rosser, 2000, p.9 
 
Invariably, the ‘Mathematical House’ defines ‘discontinuity’ in terms of one or another so-
called ‘rigorous’ characterization of ‘continuity’, usually some variant or generalization of 
what we think of as the notoriously unintuitive (or counter-intuitive) ‘e-d’ definition. 
Economists who tackle ‘discontinuity in economic theory and economic discontinuities’, to 
use the title of chapter 1 of Rosser (2000), are, usually, ‘the slaves of some defunct’ 
mathematician (pace  Keynes). To liberate ourselves from this bondage to some defunct 
mathematician, it will be necessary to understand how the mathematical house came to 
accept, adopt and even sanctify the particular definition(s) of continuity that prevail in the 
accepted mathematical culture of modern analysis. For, to the best of our knowledge, all 
mathematical houses began, first, by defining a particular kind of continuity, as encapsulating 
the corresponding intuitive notion, and then defining discontinuity negatively – as the 
absence of that property (or properties) characterizing the defined notion of continuity.  
 
There are at least four kinds of mathematical analysis: standard real analysis, non-standard 
analysis, constructive analysis and computable analysis








are further subdivisions – for example, constructive analysis could be of the pure Brouwerian 
variety, the Bishop adaptations of the original Brouwer intuitionistic kind of constructive 
mathematics, Russian constructivism, etc. The Bishop version tries to find common ground 
with standard real analysis. Russian constructivism is an amalgam of the Brouwerian version 
and computable mathematics, and so on.  
 
Now, typical rigorous definitions of a continuous function in each of these kinds of 
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Boas, 1996, p. 85 
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Bishop, 1967, p. 34. 
It will be noted that the quantifier symbol for ‘there exists’ is used in the ‘standard’ definition 
but not in the constructive case. This is, of course, because the logical meaning of the concept 
in the two kinds of mathematics is very different: tertium non datur is valid in the former 
case, not so in the latter case. Equally, for the case of the ‘modulus of continuity’. 
Non­Standard Analysis 
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Goodstein, 1961, pp. 8, 39. 
These canonical definitions, representing the different kinds of mathematical analysis do not 
even begin to exhaust the possibilities for variations on the theme of continuity of functions
6. 
This being so, what, then, of discontinuity? Assuming we are in the world of the standard real 
analyst, fortified by the Dirichlet-Kuratowski definition of a function as a graph, consider the 
following diagram, where ABCD is a trapezoid symmetrical about the line, LL (see, 
Thurston, 1989): 






Now, let S consist of the points of AB a rational distance from A together with the points of 
CD an irrational distance from D. Next, if LL is, first, considered as the y-axis, then S is the 
graph of a discontinuous function; if, however, LL is considered the x-axis, then S is the 
graph of a continuous function.  
Hugh Thurston suggests, in the original paper in which this example appeared, that the 
















But we like to think the fault lies in Dirichlet-Kuratowski definition of a function as a graph, 
in the first place
7. 
Now,  will the real continuous function please stand up ( pace Keith Devlin, 
http://www.maa.org/devlin/devlin_5_00.html)?).  
Surely, each of the four definitions has a claim to represent an intuition about the concepts 
‘continuity’ and ‘function’? Should we, as economists, choose the one that would not allow 
this kind of schizophrenic monster to emerge in an economic formalism? What exactly is – 
should be – the role of intuition is forging precise, formal, mathematical definitions? 
Consider, now, an example constructed by Barkley Rosser, Snr., in the opening pages of his 
classic book on Logic (Rosser, Snr., 1978). In this example of an ‘imaginary interview’ 
between a modern mathematician, say Professor X, and Descartes, the dialogue is about 
coming to an understanding and an agreement about replacing the latter’s vague and intuitive 
notion of continuity, with the former’s (ostensibly) more rigorous ‘e-d’ definition of the 
identically worded concept. The dialogue ends with agreements and understandings, but with 
a final question posed by Descartes to Professor X (ibid, p.2): 
“I have here an important concept which I call continuity. At present my notion of it 
is rather vague, not sufficiently vague that I cannot decide which curves are 
continuous, but too vague to permit of careful proofs. You are proposing a precise 
definition of this same notion. However, since my definition is too vague to be the 
basis for a careful proof, how are we going to verify that my vague definition and 
your precise definition are definitions of the same thing.”  
This eternal problem of replacing vague, intuitive, notions with rigorous mathematical 
characterizations was felicitously solved in one famous case, where also Rosser,Snr., was a 
pioneer: The Church-Turing Thesis (Kleene, 1952, p. 317) on the characterization of the 
vague and intuitive notion of effective calculability with the precise notion of Turing Machine 








fundamental contributions, as a student of Alonzo Church), or of any of a few other formally 
equivalent notions
8.  
It has, however, never been squarely faced in the case of continuity; and, hence, obviously, 
never has a ‘Continuity Thesis’ been suggested to underpin any formal characterization. In 
juxtaposing the emergence of the concept of the Church-Turing Thesis, out of the confluence 
of ideas that led to its formal statement in the 1930s, Robin Gandy made a most pertinent 
observation:  
“During the early part of this century it was realized that intuitive notions of ‘limit’ 
and ‘continuous’ could be applied in contexts quite different from those in which they 
had first been given precise definitions (viz. the theory of functions of real and 
complex variables). It seemed, and in standard texts such as Bourbaki’s ‘Éléments de 
Mathématique’ still seems, that these notions could be definitively characterized by 
introducing axioms for a ‘topological space’ and then defining the notion in terms of 
the primitive terms which occur in the axioms. However, cases have arisen in which 
there is a clear intuitive notion of continuity which cannot be so defined. For example, 
the notion of continuity which Kreisel .. uses in introducing his ‘continuous functional 
of finite type’, and certain refinements of it, are not topological. But there is a 
generalization, ‘filter space’, in which Kreisel’s notion of continuity can be simply 
and directly expressed. Despite much evidence from examples, and from the 
confluence of definitions – in terms of open sets, neighbourhoods, and operations of 
closure – ‘topological space’ is not the definitive concept.” 
  Gandy, 1994; p. 73; underlined emphases added. 
The same, of course, applies to the function concept, not only in the pure mathematical senses 
of alternative definitions as in the four examples for continuous functions given above, but 
also as in the example of the controversy surrounding Dirac’s d-function and its alleged 
illegitimacy as a standard function. It was only after the generalization of the function 
concept by Laurent Schwartz and others that the d-function was legitimized as a proper 
mathematical construct by the mathematicians. Dirac’s honed mathematical physics intuition 
ran far ahead of the internal, almost incestuous, development of the function concept.  
Surely, there is a lesson to be learned here, for the mathematical economist? 
In general, the formal definition of discontinuity is simply the absence of the property of 
continuity








that some of the more interesting conundrums begin to appear. The classic distinction 
between a discontinuity of the first and second kind (cf. Rudin, 1976, p. 94) is almost 
invariably presented in terms of the following example: 
() ()
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However, in the variant of computable analysis (recursive analysis) for which a definition of 
continuity we have defined above (Goodstein, 1961), the value of a recursively continuous 
function for a recursive real argument is constructed, not defined. Hence the above example 
‘finds no place in recursive analysis’ (ibid, p. 43). 
Most famously, Markov proved, in 1954 (Markov, 1958, p. 192), the famous theorem on the 
impossibility of discontinuity of constructive functions of a real variable. Since this was a 
result developed within Russian constructivism it may well be more useful to state it in terms 
of  recursive functions. A fairly mundane formal statement of the theorem – in terms of 
recursive functions - is given as an exercise in Beeson’s encyclopaedic text on The 
Foundations of Constructive Mathematics (Beeson, 1985, p. 66, exercise 4): 
  Definition: Recursive Discontinuity 
A function f from the reals to the reals is said to have a recursive discontinuity at x if 
there is a positive rational number x and a recursive sequence xn  of recursive reals 
converging (recursively) to x, such that f (xn) is bounded away from f (x) by x. 
Markov’s Theorem 
  A recursive function of a real variable cannot have a recursive discontinuity.  
The proof is fairly easy, using the Unsolvability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines 
that an effective operation cannot have a recursive discontinuity (ibid).  
A perceptive reader would immediately see the amalgam of constructive mathematics and 







where the Unsolvability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines is used. This means, of 
course, an appeal is made to the Church-Turing Thesis – something that is avoided in pure 
Constructive Mathematics (Brouwer, Bishop, Bridges, Richman, etc.). 
In terms of pure computable analysis the related result is that computable implies continuity 
(although the contra-positive is not true
10; cf. Weihrauch, 2000, p. 71). The equivalent in the 
Brouwerian version of constructive mathematics is, of course, his famous original theorem 
that every function defined on a closed unit interval is uniformly continuous. 
In fact, in this case of pure constructive mathematics – i.e., Brouwer’s original version, 
underpinned by intuitionistic logic – there is no place for discontinuity at all! Brouwer, in 
fact, introduced his axioms for intuitionism mainly to try to regain the core results about 
continuity. Bishop, on the other hand, with his attempt to develop a constructive mathematics 
consistent, as much as possible, with standard mathematics, avoided the axioms of 
intuitionism. He simply modified the definition of continuous function on the real numbers to 
mean uniform continuity – as did Goodstein, even at the elementary analysis level (cf. 
Palmgren, 2005; Goodstein, 1948).  
Weyl’s pungent summary of the Constructive approach to continuity, given in his Zurich 
Lectures of 1920, may help focus the way one should view even discontinuity (van Stigt, 
1990, p. 379; italics added): 
 “It is clear that one cannot explain the concept ‘continuous function in a bounded 
interval’ without including ‘uniform continuity’ and ‘boundedness in the definition. 
Above all, there cannot be any function in a continuum other than continuous 
functions. When the Old Analysis introduced ‘discontinuous functions’ it showed 
most clearly how far it had departed from a clear understanding of the essence of the 
continuum. What is nowadays called a discontinuous function is in reality no than a 
number of functions in separate continua …” 
Those of us who do our formal economic modelling with the mathematics of the 
constructivists – of any variety – or of the recursion theorist do not pay much attention to the 
conundrums posed by non-continuities (to retain a primitive intuition which seems to have 









Therefore, the question that puzzles us is quite simple to pose: why should economists 
confine themselves to standard real analysis for modelling economic phenomena? The 
domain of real analysis is manifestly unsuited for economic modelling – especially in the age 
of the digital computer. Should we, then, be surprised that the paradoxes of discontinuity are 
ubiquitous in models of economic dynamics? 
But, then, the paradoxes of uncomputabilities, undecidabilities and incompleteness would 
have to be faced, as squarely as Barkley Rosser has courageously faced the conundrums 
posed by discontinuities.   
 §3. Taming Relaxation Oscillations – with Ducks. 
“It is no exaggeration to say that bifurcation theory is the mathematics of 
discontinuity.” 
Rosser, 2000, p. 12; italics in the original. 
In chapter 2 of his admirable summary ‘manifesto’ for a General Theory of Economic 
Discontinuities’, Rosser points out (ibid, p. 19; bold italics added: 
“Among the elementary catastrophes the two simplest, the fold and the cusp, have 
been applied the most to economic problems. Figure 2.4 (Fig.2, here) depicts the fold 
catastrophe with one control variable and one state variable. Two values of the control 
variable constitute the catastrophe or bifurcation set, the points where discontninuous 
behaviour in the state variable can occur, even though the control variable may be 
smoothly varying. [Fig. 2] also shows a hysteresis cycle as the control variable 
oscillates and discontinuous jumps and drops of the state variable occur at the 
bifurcation points. 
….[T]he state variable would drop to the lower branch as soon as it lies under the 
upper branch and vice versa. The middle branch represents an unstable equilibrium 
and hence unattainable except by infinitesimal accident.” 
Are unstable equilibria ‘unattainable except by infinitesimal accident’? Rosser has, as usual, 
perceptively juxtaposed two important concepts of relevance for the economic modelling 














What would constitute an ‘infinitesimal accident’? We shall interpret ‘infinitesimal’ in its 
precise non-standard sense and demonstrate the clear possibility of an ‘attainable unstable 
equilibrium’. 
 
Recent results and work in experimental economics (Plott & Smith, 1999) pose fundamental 
challenges to the traditional economic theorist’s view, almost bordering on a dogma
11, that 
unstable systems are unobservable and unattainable on ordinary scales. The classic view in 
economics was articulated a long time ago, by no less an authority than Paul Samuelson: 
“The plausibility of … a stability hypothesis is suggested by the consideration that 
positions of unstable equilibrium, even if they exist, are transient, nonpersistent states, 
and hence on the crudest probability calculation would be observed less frequently 
than stable states.  How many times has the reader seen an egg standing upon its 
end?” 













The cubic characteristic of, in particular, the (unforced) van der Pol equation, generates a 
geometry that is identical to the fold. The van der Pol equation, and its integrated form as the 
Rayleigh equation, played an important role in the nonlinear (endogenous) theory of the 
business cycle in the `Golden Age' of Keynesian dominance
12. The full economic background 
to its use in business cycle theory, and the mathematical underpinnings, are extensively 
discussed in a series of three papers and we refer the interested reader to them for further 
information. 
Our interest here is to point out how, using nonstandard analysis, unusual phase portraits 
were discovered for this fascinating equation
13. In particular, to show – only as an example – 
how the bifurcation of multi-phase dynamical systems (cf. Day, 1994, Ch. 6), in particular of 
the Liénard-van der Pol variety, can show the attainability and persistence of unstable limit 
cycles. These cycles, emerging from a bifurcation point off the ‘cubic characteristic’ of, say, a 
van der Pol equation, at the ‘infinitely fast’ transition to the stable manifold, are now called 
‘Canards’
14 in ‘honour’ of the geometric appearance of the phase portraits, which resemble a 
‘Duck’s Head’. The ‘Duck’s Head’ manifests a persistent cycle and resides in the unstable 
manifold of the state space.  
Zvonkin and Shubin, in their detailed and rigorous analysis of the issue here, summarised 
admirably the nature of the discovery (Zvonkin & Shubin, 1984, p.69; italics added): 
“Ducks are certain singular solutions of equations with a small parameter, which are 
studied in the theory of relaxation oscillations. These solutions were first found for the 
van der Pol equation, and their form resembled that of a flying duck. Duck theory is, 























It was not by chance that ducks were discovered with the help of non-standard 
analysis and in connection with it. We think that the language of non-standard 
analysis will make it easy for a wide circle of mathematicians to become acquainted 
with the theory of ducks and the theory of relaxation oscillations in general." 
Relaxation oscillations encompass two-phase dynamics in the sense that there is an 
interaction between slow and fast variables in the system, rather like one set of markets 
clearing `infinitely fast', and another set clearing relatively slowly. The problem, of course, is 
that `infinitely fast' is a meaningless concept in standard analysis, but an eminently sensible 
notion in nonstandard analysis; analogously, the `infinitesimal' is a fully viable concept in 
nonstandard analysis, but not so in standard analysis. Hence, Rosser’s perceptive caveat that 
they are ‘infinitesimal accidents’ – which they have to be in standard real analysis. 
Consider, now, the following variant of the van der Pol equation (or consider it as a special 












This can be represented as the equivalent phase-plane system:
dx
dt




















The phase-plane dynamics depicted in the diagrams below are for the following numerical 
values of a and ε (where the red curves are, in both cases, the graphs of the ‘cubic 
characteristic’): 
1.  For Figure 3,: α=.5;ε=1000; 
2.  Figure 4 (the `Duck Headed vdP' dynamics) is obtained for: α=.001012345;ε=1000; 
                                                            

































The proof of existence of `Unheaded Ducks;, i.e., counter-intuitive cycles being attracted to 
unstable manifolds, for the van der Pol system is extremely simple - provided one learns a bit 
of nonstandard analysis - or, at least, nonstandard terminology. Let us simply state it, in as 
heuristic and intuitive way as possible, to illustrate what we mean; the interested reader can 
get a clear idea from the exceptionally clear and detailed article by Zvonkin and Shubin 
(op.cit.). The only thing to keep in mind is that α in an infinitesimal in the sense of 
nonstandard analysis. Then
16 (referring to the last two phase-portraits and using f generically 
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The point of the exercise is that a knowledge of the possibilities for exploring a dynamical 
system with parameters and variables taking actual infinitesimal and infinite values is 
indispensable - not just for reasons of pure mathematical aesthetics; but also for eminent 
economic reasons, where financial market variables move `infinitely' fast, at least relative to 
`real' variables; and reactions in market sentiments to `infinitesimal' variations in parameters 
is a non-negligible factor in turbulent markets. An economist, narrowly trained in standard 
mathematics will always have to resort to ad hockeries to handle the infinitesimal and the 
infinite - for example, in models capable of relaxation oscillations. Quite apart from 
aesthetics and pragmatics, it is also the case that the mathematics of nonstandard analysis is 
intuitively natural, pragmatically constructive and conceptually much simpler, without any of  
the contorted paraphernalia of the Weierstrassian `ε-δ′ calisthenics. 
It is to Barkley Rosser’s credit that his honed analytical intuition was able to see the need for 








“I would like to make it clear that I find merit in the Catastrophe theorist’s use of 
modern calculus and geometric techniques in models in science. In particular 
discontinuities can often best be understood via this kind of mathematics. For 
example it would be important to find a calculus oriented approach model for the 
computer, a machine which is intrinsically discrete. Such a calculus model would not 
be exact, but it would give great insight to automata theory.” 
Smale, 1978, p.1366. 
 
Even the gods nod – sometimes! Smale discourses as if constructive and computable analysis 
do not furnish a ‘calculus oriented approach model for the computer, a machine which is 
intrinsically discrete’. What else are they, if they are not at least that? Indeed, comstructive 
and computable analysis are, in precise senses, much more ‘exact’ than the conceptual 
fudging that masquerades as precise analysis in standard calculus with its reliance on 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and the Axiom of Choice. How numerical and quantitative and 
computational can such a calculus be- compared to the other three kinds of mathematics? 
We have attempted to start from visions that Rosser has, over a period of thirty years, 
developed for economic theory, mathematical modelling of economic phenomena and 
applicable dynamic theory from the vantage point of mathematical theories of discontinuities. 
The inspiration from Rosser’s provocative visions have helped focus our attention – and, we 
hope the economic profession’s – on the importance of thinking about discontinuities in 
mathematically coherent ways. Rosser has tirelessly propagated the view that one of the best 
ways to understand and, perhaps, tame –formally - the unruly dynamics of the economic 
world would be to underpin them in a theory of dynamic discontinuities. 
We have tried to clarify the mathematics of continuity, given that the pure mathematics of 
discontinuity seems always to have been developed as a minor corollary to characterizations 
of continuity in different kinds of mathematics. Our melancholy conclusion is that standard 
real analysis is wholly unsuited to any serious discourse about discontinuity, especially from 
a quantitative and computational sense – those senses that are crucial for an applied, policy 
oriented, science like economics.  
We dismiss ad hoc justifications given by unreflective economists -- or would-be economists 
– for modelling economic phenomena in terms of standard real analysis and its version of  
20 
 
continuity, as not worth serious consideration from the point of view of the foundations of 
mathematics or even from the vantage point of numerically meaningful and computationally 
significant mathematical formalisms. For example it is claimed – in a sense in the spirit of 
Smale’s above criterion – by Mount and Reiter (Mount & Reiter, 2002, p.1) that:  
"Computing with real numbers  .... is also relevant to applications in economic theory. 
Economic models typically use real variables and functions of them." 
But it is not explained or even seriously discussed why `economic models typically use real 
variables ...  .'. Similarly, discussion about continuity, discontinuity and dynamics has almost 
entirely been in terms of real analysis. We think this is an unproductive and, ultimately, a 
futile exercise. Our reasons, many of them given above, are methodological and 
epistemological. 
The standard epistemological vision may well be the one that was propagated by Hilary 
Putnam and Willard Van Orman Quine (Putnam, 1979, Quine, 1948) and generally referred 
to as the ‘indispensability argument’. The spirit of our discussion in the main body of this 
paper is best summarised by the deep objections raised by Solomon Feferman to the Putnam-
Quine ‘indispensability thesis’ (Feferman, 1998). The `indispensabilists' flounder on the deep 
ontological issues and doubts raised about their program by Feferman (ibid, p. 284)
17: 
"If one accepts the indispensability arguments, there still remain two critical 
questions: 
Q1. Just which mathematical entities are indispensable to current scientific theories? 
Q2. Just what principles concerning those entities are needed for the required 
mathematics?" 
We believe these are the two crucial questions, even if not framed in the context of a critique 
of an `indispensability argument', that a mathematical economist, who relies exclusively on 
any one type of mathematical formalism for economic modelling, should try to answer - or, at 
least, keep as disciplining background criteria. Our vision in this paper is almost entirely 
                                                            









disciplined by these two perceptive questions that Feferman raises against the 
`indispensabilists'. In other words, we take it that the serious mathematical economist is at 
least a closet `indispensabilist' and, therefore, the themes in this essay are grounded on: (a). 
casting doubt on the kind of `mathematical entities that are considered indispensable' in 
orthodox mathematical modelling of economic discontinuities; and, (b). questioning the kind 
of `principles concerning entities [such as continuity, discontinuity and dynamics]' that are 
claimed as `necessary for the required mathematics'. Our examples are, therefore, chosen to 
illustrate that the chosen `mathematical entities' and the `principles concerning these entities' 
are not appropriate, necessary, relevant or indispensable for mathematical economic 
modelling – if they are extracted from, embedded in, or belong to the framework of, standard 
real analysis.  
Barkley Rosser raised the important questions, set the standards against which they must be 
considered, and provided preliminary hints towards some kind of solutions to them: to the 
problem of continuity, discontinuity and dynamics in economic modelling. Rosser’s visions 
defined a part of the frontier of methodology in economic modelling. It is our duty to try to 
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